At present, more and more listed companies use multiple accounting performance information to formulate executive compensation. This paper takes the sample of non-financial listed companies in 2012-2017 as the research object and finds that the impact of accounting information heterogeneity must be considered in the study of the rationality of excessive compensation. In general, the excessive compensation of executives of listed companies in China is positively related to the future performance, that is, the improvement of future performance is the embodiment of the executives obtaining reasonable excessive compensation in the current period. At the same time, the higher the degree of heterogeneity of accounting performance information, the more likely the executives can choose information that is beneficial to themselves, which has infringed the interests of the shareholders. The compensation received by executives does not fully represent their effort. At this time, the sensitivity of excessive compensation and future performance decreases, and the rationality of excessive compensation is weakened. In further research, the impact mechanism of the relationship between excessive compensation and future performance is analyzed. The conclusions help listed companies to improve their executive performance evaluation and compensation design system.