How to Achieve Accurate Accountability Under Current Administrative Accountability System for Work Safety Accidents in Chemical Industry in China: A Case Study on Major Work Safety Accidents During 2010-2020
Positive achievements have been attained since the implementation of administrative accountability system in China. However, the effect of the said system for work safety accidents in chemical industry is unsatisfactory, and the operation way of the government's public power lacks substantial innovation. By analyzing the administrative accountability of 11 major work safety accidents in chemical industry during 2010-2020, the dilemma of public power in the administrative accountability in compartmentalized governance and vertically decentralized authoritarianism was explored from the perspective of empirical analysis in this paper. The research found that current administrative accountability system has such drawbacks as unclear subject of responsibility of public power, ambiguous ownership of responsibility, imperfect democratic structure and information asymmetry. To achieve effective operation of public power in work safety administrative accountability system, attention should be paid to promote the formation of accountability synergy and strengthen the diversification of accountability subjects, and to boost the disclosure of information, improve the transparency of the operation of public power, and reinforce the consistency between power and responsibilities. Moreover, it is necessary to establish and improve the legal system for administrative accountability for work safety accidents, clarify the division of responsibility and achieve accurate accountability, so as to enhance the rationality and operability of the administrative accountability system.
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